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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between self-efficacy and false memories 
using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, whereby people falsely remember words 
not presented in lists. In two studies participants were presented with DRM lists and asked to recall 
and recognize presented items. In the first study, we found a significant relationship between 
memory self-efficacy (MSE) and susceptibility to associative memory illusions, both in recall and 
recognition. They also received the Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (MSEQ), the Big Five 
Questionnaire (BFQ) and the backward digit span (BDS) test. 
In the second study, MSE was manipulated in order to assess whether changes influenced the 
sensitivity parameter in DRM tasks. Results showed that the manipulation was effective in 
decreasing self-efficacy, which in turn affected the probability of reporting critical lures as well as 
sensitivity. Possible explanations for the effect are discussed.  
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Introduction 
Understanding individual differences in memory has become a crucial topic in 
modern psychological research. Moreover to understand the factors that influence 
memory illusions could help to improve the applications in several fields, like 
psychology of testimony, learning psychology and psychotherapy. In particular, our 
interest is in understanding the relationship between individual difference, as 
measured by state and trait factors, and false memory as measured using the 
Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm.  
In DRM paradigm, people study lists of associated words and then take a recall or 
recognition memory test. Each presented list is semantically associated to at least one 
specific non-presented words (known as critical lures; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) 
and are listed in backward associative strength (BAS), such that the most strongly 
associated word is presented first, then the second, and so forth. For example, one list 
includes sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, etc., which should elicit the false 
recall of the critical lure sweet.  
There are several theories that can explain from different point of view the DRM 
illusion (see Gallo, 2010 for a review). Here we shortly report the Activation-
Monitoring Theory (hereafter AMT) and the Fuzzy Trace Theory (hereafter FTT). 
This theory concern the interaction between two processes. The firs process is the 
spread activation, which describes a higher probability for critical lure being falsely 
remembered, due to the repeated activation of characteristics that the critical lure 
shares with the other words in the list. This leads to remember the critical word as a 
list word. Nevertheless, the theory accounts a monitoring process that reduces false 
memories trying to determine the origins of this activated information and that a false 
memory occur when this process fail (e.g., Roediger& McDermott, 2000; Roediger, 
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). (Benjamin, 2001; McDermott & Watson, 
2001).   
Also the FTT (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) assumes the 
intervention of a monitoring process during the memory task. However, differently 
from the AMT, this theory focuses on the storage of meaning relations; indeed the 
main assumption is the separate encoding of two type of memory trace: verbatim 
trace and gist trace. A verbatim trace contains the surface form of presented words 
and, by definition, it disappears earlier than the gist trace that is the representation of 
the list meaning. According to FTT, a false memory occurs with an illusory 
recollection of the gist trace. 
In the present paper, we describe two distinct studies. In the first study we 
investigate the relationship between individual differences and false memories. In the 
second one, we manipulated the self-efficacy variable that we found to be related to 
false memories in the first study. 
Presently, not many researches are conducted on the relationship between false 
memories and individual differences; most of them have focused on the manipulation 
of the DRM paradigm (Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005). In respect to this, 
(Sanford & Fisk, 2009) these studies showed a significant relationship between the 
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associative networks of semantic and episodic memory and extroversion/introversion 
dimensions of personality as measured by the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) In the 
first study we retested the relationship between extraversion and false memories. 
Furthermore, because no studies investigated the relationship between MSE and Big 
Five of personality we are interesting in investigate it. 
Even less research has been conducted regarding the focus of the present study, 
namely on memory self-efficacy (hereafter MSE), it has been conceptualized in two 
principal ways (Berry, 1999). In one approach, derived from Bandura’s self-efficacy 
theory, MSE refers to the belief of holding efficient memory skills evaluated in the 
context of specific memory tasks (Berry, 1996; Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011). 
Another approach, derived from the meta-memory framework, conceptualizes MSE 
as “one’s sense of mastery or capability to use memory effectively in memory-
demanding situations” (Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1990). In this approach, MSE is a 
generalized judgment that is abstracted from specific tasks and situation 
characteristics.  
Furthermore, in the present study we used MSE taking in to account the Bandura’s 
suggestions (1997), therefore as based on various sources of information, including 
the appraisal of the relevant features of a task and situation, as well as task-specific, 
domain-specific, and global beliefs about one’s memory abilities. One’s concurrent 
MSE is based on the perceived characteristics of the memory task to be performed, 
on personal-state variables (e.g., concurrent physiological state and mood), and, 
whether no previous experience with the task is available, on more generalized 
beliefs about one’s memory abilities (Hertzog et al., 1990b). 
Self-efficacy affects the ability to cope, which indirectly supports the hypothesis 
that the level of MSE affects cognitive performance (Heitzmann et al., 2011; Coffee 
& Rees, 2011). According to Bandura’s self-efficacy theory (1989, 1997), higher 
confidence in one’s memory leads to higher memory performance due to greater 
effort expenditure, greater persistence in the face of difficulties, higher performance 
goals, and lower state anxiety. Some studies have shown a significant positive 
correlation between MSE and working memory (hereafter WM) (Caldeira de 
Carvalho, Marcourakis, Artes, & Gorenstein, 2002; Potter & Hartman, 2006), others 
reported that WM is predictive of false recognition (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Peters et al., 2007). Since WM could mediate the relation between MSE and 
DRM performance, we decided to include it in our analysis. 
Because no previous study has assessed whether MSE affects the extent to which 
people develop false memories, we investigated this hypothesis using two different 
experiments. The focus of the first study was to examine the relationship between 
false memories and individual difference traits mentioned above. In the second 
experiment, we tested whether experimentally induced changes in MSE (considered 
as a state variable) produce changes in memory performance.  
Experimental studies which try to manipulate personal variables such as MSE are 
rare, and in most cases do not include any measure of memory performance (e.g. 
Sanbonmatsu, Harpster, Akimoto, & Moulin, 1994). Among studies in which 
memory performance is assessed, one did not report any MSE manipulation effect on 
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memory performance (Gardiner, Luszcz, & Bryan, 1997), while another reported an 
effect of manipulation on both MSE and memory performance but did not test 
whether the impact of manipulation on memory performance was mediated by MSE 
changes (Nicoson, Dick, Lineweaver, & Hertzog, 2008). 
 
Study 1 
The purpose of the first study was to investigate individual differences in false 
memory. Particularly we wanted to examine whether MSE can determine memory 
performance, using the DRM paradigm. In the DRM paradigm people study lists of 
associated words and then take a free recall and recognition memory test. The typical 
result is that people often falsely remember a non-studied critical word associated 
with the words in the list. According to self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1989), 
individuals with low MSE should be less willing than individuals with higher levels 
of MSE to expend mental effort during the DRM tasks. We hypothesize that 
individuals with higher MSE are better able to initiate intentional monitoring 
activities and screen out potential memory errors, including critical false memories, 
compared to individuals with low levels of self-efficacy. Moreover, we expect that 
only MSE for words is predictive of performance in the DRM paradigm, because this 
scale is closer to DRM conditions than the MSE scales for groceries and errands. 
 Furthermore, we tested the hypothesis that the confidence intervals of the 
recognition task could be related to MSE as a meta-memory task. As regards to BFQ, 
coherently with previous researches (e.g., Paddock et al., 2000; Sanford & Fisk, 
2009) we aspect that extroverts produce a significantly greater number of false 
memories than introverts. In this study, we also assessed the role of WM in predicting 
performance of a DRM task. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Forty-one native English speakers students from the University of Hull (UK), 10 
were male, 31 were female (mean age = 20.6; SD = 4.35). Forty-one native Italian 
speakers students from the Sapienza University of Rome, 11 were male, 30 were 
female (mean age = 24.8; SD = 6.04).1 
 
Materials 
DRM lists – Study items were 14 of the lists rated by Stadler, Roediger, and 
McDermott (1999) as producing medium levels of false recognition. Each list 
consisted of 15 associations of a non-presented critical lure (see Appendix). The 
recognition test included a printed sheet containing 28 studied words (two from each 
list), 14 critical lures of the studied lists, plus 28 non-presented words semantically 
                                                          
1 There were exclusion criteria that included psychiatric and learning disorders estimated asking participants if they 
had experienced in the past psychiatric disorders or learning disabilities and if they were used to assume drugs.  
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related with critical lures and 28 words unrelated to critical lures or any other word in 
this list. As the Italian language does not possess as many extensive association 
norms as the English language (Buchanan et al., 2012), we translated the original 
English stimuli, matching use frequency, into Italian. For this purpose we referred to 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008) and Corpus e Lessico di 
Frequenza dell’Italiano Scritto (Corpus and Frequency Lexicon of Written Italian) 
(Bertinetto, et al., 2005). 
 
Backward Digit Span (BDS) – This test is used to measure WM, attention, 
concentration, and mental control (Ostrosky-Solís & Lozano, 2006). In a typical test 
of memory span, a list of random numbers is read out loud at a rate of one item per 
second. At the conclusion of the list, participants are asked to recall all digits in 
reverse order. The test begins with three digits, increasing one digit after each two 
sequences of digits until people fail to report two sequences of the same length. 
 
Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (MSEQ) – This questionnaire includes the 
description of several memory exercises (classic laboratory tasks and more everyday 
tasks) which must be carried out at different levels (Berry, West & Dennehey, 1989). 
Subjects are required to decide whether or not they are capable of attaining each level 
of performance for each task and to state their level of confidence. For this study we 
selected three MSE scales: chores, groceries and words. 
 
Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) – This is a personality test (Caprara, Barbaranelli, 
Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1985) based on five major 
dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and 
neuroticism. In this study, we used the 50 item short version of BFQ. 
 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually in a room set up to avoid distractions and 
interference. DRM lists were administered in random order through headphones 
connected to a computer. The words were presented with a frequency of one every 
1.5 seconds. Subjects were instructed to recall each list after listening to it. The 
request to recall the words in the list followed the presentation of each list. Recall of 
all 14 lists was followed by the backward digit span task administration. The DRM 
recognition task was then presented. For the recognition task, subjects were asked to 
recognize the words presented in the lists from a recognition list containing new and 
old words by indicating a level of confidence for each item (4 = certainly old; 3 = 
probably old; 2 = probably new; 1 = certainly new). After this step, the MSEQ and 
BFQ questionnaires were presented and filled out.  
 
Results 
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Preliminary analysis 
As previously explained, in this study we used two language groups; in order to 
compare DRM results we conducted some preliminary analyses that showed some 
differences between the Italian and English groups in correct recall and in correct 
recognition. For this reason, we decided to analyze the two language groups 
separately. Nevertheless, no significant differences were found between these two 
groups in the MSEQ or false memory production. 
 
Recall 
An overall two (languages: English and Italian) by three (type of recall: correct, 
critical and non-critical errors) ANOVA was computed on recall scores. The results 
showed a main effect for type of recall, F (1, 80) = 419.59, ηp2 = .84, p < .001 (Mhits= 
.58, SDhits = .08, Mcl= .39, SDcl= .18, Mn-cl= .07, SDn-cl=05). While the performance 
in the two language groups differed significantly in the proportion of correct recall, 
F(1,80) = 6.67, ηp2 =.07, p = .012 (Meng= .61, SDeng = .08, Mita= .56, SDita= .08), no 
difference was observed in false memory production, either for critical recall, F(1,80) 
= 0.77, ηp2 =.01, p = .382 (Meng= .41, SDeng= .21, Mita= 37, SDita= .16), or non-
critical recall, F(1,80) = 0.946, ηp2 =.01, p = .334 (Meng= .03, SDeng= .02, Mita= .04, 
SDita= .03). 
In spite of the significant differences in correct recall, the curves of the serial 
position in the recall task of English and Italian words had the same trend. Figure 1 
shows the typical effect of the DRM paradigm, i.e. a percentage of critical lures 
comparable to those of the words positioned in the middle of the list (this overlap is 
around 40% for both groups). 
 
Figure 1. First experiment: mean proportion of words correctly recalled by serial position and mean proportion of 
critical lures falsely recalled averaged over all lists 
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Recognition 
A similar ANOVA was computed for the recognition scores. Similar to the results 
in recall, there was a main effect of languages, F (1, 80) = 546.66, ηp2 = .87, p < .001 
(Mhits= .71, SDhits = .11, Mcl= .76, SDcl= .22, Mrel= .24, SDrel=12, Mnrel= .11, 
SDnrel=07). Moreover, results showed a significant interaction between Italian group 
and English group for hits, F (1, 80) = 5.78, MSE = 0.34, p = .018; the English group 
reported a mean percentage of hits significantly higher than the Italian group 
(respectively Meng= .74, SDeng = .12, Mita= .68, SDita= .10). Instead, no significant 
difference between the two languages in critical lure production was found, F (1, 80) 
= 1.67, MSE = 0.01, p = .20. Furthermore, a significant difference for unrelated 
errors, F (1, 80) = 4.04, MSE = 0.21, p = .048 (see, Table 1) was obtained but not for 
related errors, F(1,80) = 0.69, MSE = 0.40, p = .409. 
With respect to confidence scores, in both languages critical lures were recognized 
as occurring with the same frequency as presented words. Critical lures, when judged 
as old, were reported with more ‘not sure’ responses than studied words. Vice versa, 
when a word was judged as new, more certain responses for critical lures were 
reported. Moreover, related errors were recognized as presented words more 
frequently than unrelated errors; certain/probably judgments reflect this result (see, 
Table 1).  
Results of both recall and recognition showed that the translation of the DRM lists 
into the Italian language did not change probability of the list inducing false memory; 
the English group and Italian group were comparable in this crucial dimension. 
 
Table 1.First experiment recognition results: the proportion of items classified as certainly old (a rating of 4), probably 
old (3), probably new (2), or certainly new (1) and the mean proportion of words recognized as presented in DRM lists. 
      Old   New   Mean 
Study status 4   3   2   1   Rating 
      ENG ITA   ENG ITA   ENG ITA   ENG ITA   ENG ITA 
Studied   .61 .56   .13 .15   .16 .15   .10 .14   .74 .71 
Nonstudied                             
  Critical lure .55 .58   .20 .23   .10 .09   .15 .13   .74 .81 
  Weaklyrealatedlure .08 .08   .15 .17   .37 .26   .40 .42   .23 .25 
  Unrelatedlure .05 .05   .05 .07   .41 .27   .49 .53   .10 .13 
 
 
Individual differences 
ANOVA conducted on data of the backward digit span test and the MSEQ showed 
no differences between language groups. Significantly, differences in three of the five 
BFQ scales were found: openness, F (1, 80) = 21.92, MSE=0.62, p<.001; 
conscientiousness, F(1,80)= 16.98, MSE=0.52, p<.001; and extraversion, F(1,80)= 
8.01, MSE=0.62, p=.006 (see Table 2). No significant difference was found in 
backward digit span scores between the English and Italian groups. 
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Table2.First experiment ANOVA and mean of individual difference tasks. 
      English (n = 41)   Italian (n = 41)   
Test Factor   M DS   M DS F (1,80) 
                  
BDS               
  
Working 
Memory 
  7.54 1.87   7.24 1.59 0.58 
MSEQ               
  MSE Grocery   27.59 7.4   30.78 7.73 3.66 
  MSE Words   27.32 5.95   29.29 6.32 2.12 
  MSE Errands   27.73 6.82   31.02 8.41 3.79 
BFQ                 
  Extraversion   38.85 6.16   38.44 4.32 0.12 
  Neuroticism   35.02 6.65   36.51 4.11 1.48 
  Openness   42.61 6.43   36.83 4.6 21.92*** 
  Consciousness   42.17 5.65   37.90 3.48 16.98*** 
  Agreeableness   41.80 6.18   38.32 4.91 8.01** 
                  
 
Note – **p< .01; ***p< .001 
 
Following analyses were computed combining English and Italian scores. For this, 
we only considered variables that didn’t show significant differences between the two 
languages groups. 
 
Multiple regression analysis 
In order to define predictors of false memories, two stepwise multiple regressions 
were conducted on critical lures for recall and recognition respectively. We 
considered as independent variables scores of tests that didn’t show significant 
differences between languages (i.e., backward digit span, all MSEQ scales used in the 
study, extraversion and neuroticism from the BFQ). 
As expected, the variance in false memories during recall was explained by scores 
in the MSE word subscale, t (80) = -3.36, p<.01, R2 = .21, which predicted false 
memories produced during recall, β = -.60, (see Table 4). None of the predictors 
explained the variance of critical lures produced during recognition. 
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Table 3.First experiment: multiple regression, using enter method. 
      Recall of Critical Lure 
  Predictor   β 
Semipartial 
r t(80) R2 
              
IncludedVariable           
  MSE Words   -0.60** -.41*** -3.36** .21** 
ExcludedVariable           
  MSE Grocery   .13   0.87   
  MSE Errands   .12   0.84   
  Extraversion   .11   1.05   
  Neuroticism   .08   0.77   
  
Working 
Memory   .02   0.17   
              
 
Note –F(1,81) = 3.0916.641, p=.009<.001 
  **p<.01; ***p< .001 
 
Memory self-efficacy and false memories 
Scores in the MSEQ for word subscale of the MSE dimension were divided using 
the median score in order to create two groups of high and low MSE words. Multiple 
ANOVA results (see Table 5) showed no significant differences between the high 
MSE group and the low MSE group for correct recall. As predicted, participants with 
high self-efficacy showed lower levels for critical lures, F (1,80)=10.17, MSE=0.29, 
p=.002, ηp2=.113. No significant difference between high and low MSE groups was 
found in correct recognition. Otherwise, participants with high self-efficacy produced 
significantly lower numbers of critical lures than participants of the group with low 
MSE, F(1,80)=8.74, MSE=0.35, p=.004, ηp2=.098. Interesting, this result reflect the 
significant differences in confidence ratings. In particular subjects with low MSE, 
when a critical false memory occurs, report being more confident than the high MSE 
group, F (1, 80) = 7.91, ηp2 = .09, p = .006 (Mlow= .63, SDlow = .04, Mhigh= .46, 
SDhigh=. 04). On the other side, high MSE group report a higher mean proportion in 
confident response in correct rejections, F (1, 80) = 8.29, ηp2 = .09, p = .005 (Mlow= 
.08, SDlow = .03, Mhigh= .21, SDhigh= .03). No significant difference was obtained for 
related errors, F (1, 80) =2.58, MSE=0.40, p=.11; conversely, a significant difference 
for unrelated errors was found, F (1, 80) =4.98, MSE=0.22, p=.028, ηp2=.059. As 
noted above, the unrelated errors score was significantly different between English 
and Italian group so we computed two separate ANOVA tests for the language 
groups using as independent variable MSE for words and unrelated error score as the 
dependent variable. Results showed that there was a significant difference in the 
number of unrelated errors between high and low MSE participants, F (1, 80) =9.22, 
MSE=1.80, p=.004 in the English group. 
Finally, a significant difference between high and low MSE was obtained in BDS 
score, F (1, 80) =15.41, MSE=0.19, p<.000, ηp2=.162. 
 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
Table 4. First experiment: ANOVA results for recall and recognition task; independent variable is memory self-efficacy 
for words. 
    High MSE   Low MSE         
    (n=19)   (n=22)       Observed 
  Variable M SD   M SD F(1,80) p ηp2 Power 
            
Recall                   
  Studied Word 124.82 18.92   121 15.98 0.98 .325 .012 .165 
  Critical Lure 4.55 2.34   6.31 2.64 10.17 .002 .112 .883 
  Non Critical Error 7.3 5.14   9.88 6.96 3.61 .061 .043 .468 
Recognition                   
  Studied Word 19.9 3.79   20.09 2.59 0.07 .785 .001 .058 
  Critical Lure 9.67 3.56   11.64 2.38 8.74 .004 .098 .823 
  WeaklyRelatedError 6.15 3.31   7.43 3.85 2.59 .111 .031 .356 
  Non RelatedError 2.62 1.75   3.59 2.15 4.99 .028 .059 .597 
Working Memory                   
  BackwardDigitSpan 8.1 1.76   6.71 1.42 15.41 <.000 .162 .972 
                      
 
 
Discussion  
We conducted separate preliminary analyses that reported significant differences 
between the English and Italian groups. However, no differences were found for the 
crucial variables (critical recall and recognition) and the probability that a word will 
elicit the critical lure in a free association paradigm was observed, both in English 
and Italian. The results of ANOVA and regression confirm our first hypothesis: the 
tendency to produce false memories in recall is predicted by MSE scores. This 
however occurs only when MSE refers to words. The MSE scales for errands and 
groceries did not predict the results of the DRM task, because they referred to 
everyday situations, as Berry, West, and Dennehey (1989) maintained. Furthermore, 
when a false recognition occurs, subjects reported a higher confidence as old item. 
On the other side, high MSE group was more confident in correct rejection. This 
result is in line with the meta-memory framework (Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1990) 
and supports the prediction that higher MSE reflects the capability to use memory 
effectively in memory-demanding situations. In particular, high MSE seems to be 
effective in avoiding false memories. 
 Our results are consistent with some studies reporting a positive correlation 
between MSE and different forms of semantic memory tasks (Gillström & Rönnberg, 
1995; Schmidt, Berg & Deelman, 2001). According to self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 
1997), MSE affects the level of performance attained on a memory task through its 
effect on motivational and affective processes, such as mental effort expenditure (i.e., 
the amount of processing resources voluntarily allocated to a task). 
As found during the current study, low MSE is related to a less efficient WM. 
Conversely, individuals with high MSE generally have better performance levels in 
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WM tasks. Nevertheless, our results showed no significant correlation between WM 
and DRM performance. 
Finally, previous studies have indicated that extraversion reliably predicts self-
efficacy (Tams, 2008), and that self-efficacy plays a mediating role between 
personality and social interest or perceived stress (Caprara et al., 2012; Nauta, 2004). 
In our study, extraversion was not correlated with any variable. 
 
Study 2 
The aim of the second study was to explore the effect of manipulating the level of 
MSE to produce false memories. As argued above, we refer to MSE as a state 
variable that can be immediately influenced by the perceived performance to the task. 
Previous research (West, Bagwell & Dark-Freudeman, 2005; West, Welch & Thorn, 
2001; Coffee & Rees, 2011; Le Foll, Rascle & Higgins, 2008) shows that when 
subjects receive feedback they engage more in a task and display better performance 
than participants that receive no feedback. Moreover, Desrichard and Köpetz (2005) 
suggest that the influence of MSE on memory can be manipulated indirectly using 
suggestive instructions. Furthermore, theories of cognitive consistency assume that 
the discrepancy between beliefs and perceived behavior creates a discomfort that 
motivates a person to reduce perceived discrepancies (Abelson et al., 1968). Finally, 
McConnell and Reed Hunt (2007) have shown that providing participants with 
feedback on their performance this feedback affected their subsequent performance to 
the same task. 
In this study, we used positive and negative feedback on subjects’ DRM recall 
performance. Both feedback types were introduced to alter the level of self-efficacy 
of the participants. Coherently with results of the previous study, we expect these 
three groups reporting different performance in DRM task. 
 
Method 
The general method used was the same as that used in the first study. 
 
Participants 
Forty-eight young Italian adults (M = 23.6, SD = 3.48) took part in the study; 23 
were male and 25 were female. Each person was tested individually in a room. 
Subjects were divided into three groups. Two groups were assigned to the 
experimental condition and one to the control group. 
 
Materials 
Twelve Italian DRM lists (used in the first experiment), recorded using a male 
voice in digital audio format at the rate of one word every two seconds were used. 
The 12 lists were randomly divided into two sets of three and one set of six. The 
recognition test consisted, for each DRM list, of one critical lure, two words included 
in the list (positions two and nine), two non-presented words associated with a critical 
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lure and two words not associated with any other word in this list. Lists were divided 
into three blocks: two by three lists and a one by six list, with different lists per block 
across participants. 
Regarding MSEQ, in the present study the scale “chores” was replaced with 
“digits”, because digits is not referred to an everyday domain. Thus in this study we 
considered an everyday task (i.e. grocery) and two laboratory domains (i.e. words and 
digits) but we focused MSE manipulation on the words domain, and not on the digits 
domain.  
Furthermore, two parallel versions of the backward digit span were used.  
 
Procedure 
All participants heard 12 DRM lists through headphones. The subjects were told 
that this was a word experiment, that they will hear several lists of words, and that at 
the end of each list (indicated when the experimenter clicked on the pause button), 
they should write as many of the words down as they could remember (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.Procedure of the second experiment. 
 
Firstly, participants filled out the MSEQ. Then they started to listen to the DRM 
lists. The subjects were given two minutes to recall each list after its presentation. 
After the last recall task of the first block subjects were distracted with an arithmetic 
calculation task. After three minutes the participants were asked to complete the 
recognition test. After the recognition task the experimenter gave a different 
feedback1 for each group about the memory performance. After the feedback the 
second block started. This block was the same as the first, but instead of an arithmetic 
task the backward digit span (BDS) test was conducted. 
The third and final block contained six rather than three lists. After the final 
recognition task, there was a three-minute interval in which the participants 
performed the BDS test. Finally, participants received the recognition task. During 
debriefing the researcher informed the subjects that the feedback was independent 
1 recognition for 6 lists
Backward digit span
6 DRM lists and 6 recall
MSEQ
Feedback 2
no feedback decreasing : "24,7/100"
increasing: 
"75,3/100"
1 recognition for 3 lists
Backward digit span
3 DRM lists and 3 recall
Feedback 1
no feedback decreasing : "24,7/100"
increasing: 
"75,3/100"
1 recognition for 3 lists
Arithmetic
3 DRM lists and 3 recall
MSEQ
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from their real performance and explained the aim of the experiment.  
 
 
Results 
No significant difference for gender was found in pre-feedback condition of self-
efficacy and performance. At the end of the experiment all participants judged the 
credibility of the feedback on a scale of five points (1: not reliable; 5: totally reliable; 
M = 4.39, SD = .72). 
An interaction between group condition (decreasing MSE, increasing MSE and 
control) and time condition (pre-feedback and post-feedback) was obtained; in 
particular it was statistically significant in MSE for number, F(2,45)=13.33, MSE= 
25.26, p<.001, and MSE for words, F(2,45)=9.01, MSE= 25.26, p<.001. Moreover, 
we computed multiple comparisons among each of the three levels of group condition 
in both level of time condition for every possible dependent variable (Table 6); 
results showed significant differences between increasing and decreasing MSE 
groups and between control and increasing MSE groups, but not between control and 
decreasing MSE groups (both in MSE for number and for words).  
Regarding DRM performance, the interaction between group and time condition 
was statistically significant only for critical recall, F (2, 45) =4.34, MSE=0.04, 
p<.05. Contrast analysis showed a significant difference in critical recall between 
control and decreasing groups and between decreasing and increasing groups in post-
feedback condition, but not in pre-feedback condition. No significant interactions 
between group and time condition were found in recognition scores and confidence 
intervals. 
 
Table 5.Second experiment: contrast test for MSEQ subscale and DRM performance in time (pre-feedback and post-
feedback) between experimental conditions (increasing and decreasing MSE) and control group. F represents 
interaction effects between group (decreasing MSE, increasing MSE and control) and time (pre/post-feedback) 
condition. 
                              
  
 
Contrast 
Pre-feedback   Post-feedback   Mixed ANOVA 3x2   
    
Control * 
Decreasin
g 
Control 
* 
Increasi
ng 
Decreasi
ng * 
Increasi
ng 
  
Contro
l * 
Decrea
sing 
Control * 
Increasin
g 
Decreasi
ng * 
Increasin
g 
  F(2,45) ηp2 
Obse
rved
Pow
er 
  
  MSE for digits                 13.33*** .37 .99   
    
Value of 
Contrast -0.75 1.06 1.81   1.31 -9 -10.31           
    Std. Error 3.25 3.25 3.25   3.44 3.44 3.44           
    t(45) -0.23 0.33 0.56   0.38 -2.61* -2.99**           
  MSE for words                 9.01** .29 .96   
    
Value of 
Contrast -3.18 -1.62 1.56   -0.31 -8.68 -8.37           
    Std. Error 2.85 2.85 2.85   3.03 3.03 3.03           
    t(45) -1.11 -0.57 0.55   -0.10 -2.87** -2.77**           
  Critical recall                 4.34* .16 .72   
    
Value of 
Contrast 0.04 0.04 0.01   -0.24 0 0.24           
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    Std. Error 0.09 0.09 0.09   0.09 0.09 0.09           
    t(45) 0.46 0.47 0.01   -2.47* 0 2.47*           
  d'                   3.19* .12 .58   
    
Value of 
Contrast -0.06 -0.11 -0.04   0.18 -0.08 -0.27           
    Std. Error 0.09 0.09 0.09   0.09 0.09 0.09           
    t(45) -0.68 -1.14 -0.46   1.83 -0.79 -2.64*           
                              
                              
 
Note – *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p<.001 
 
 
Furthermore, we computed the system sensitivity (d’) and the criterion just for the 
recall task, because in recognition no interaction effect was found2. These measures 
helped to better understand the actual impact of feedback on the DRM effect. 
Results show a group by time interaction for d’: the decreasing self-efficacy group 
effectively reduced the system sensitivity compared to the increasing self-efficacy 
group, F (2, 45) =3.19, MSE=0.08, p=.05. Multiple comparisons highlighted a 
significant d’ difference between decreasing and increasing group performance. On 
the other hand, no criterion differences between control and experimental group were 
obtained. No effect for WM task was found. 
 
Discussion 
We found two group by time condition interaction effects. The first was on MSE 
that significantly went in the predicted direction for two different experimental 
groups. Consistent with results from our first study and that conducted by Berry, 
West and Dennehey (1989), different MSEQ subscales predicted memory domains 
they referred to. In fact, we obtained an interaction effect just for laboratory memory 
task self-efficacy. Nevertheless we couldn’t discriminate between MSE for digits and 
number; it would be interesting to build a MSE scale for false memories, in order to 
better understand the MSE and false memory relationship. 
The second interaction effect was on critical lures recall. In the decreased self-
efficacy condition there were significantly more critical lures than in the two other 
conditions (increase and control). We demonstrated that decreasing/increasing self-
efficacy feedback procedures induced a substantial changing of sensitivity (d’), while 
no significant difference was observed in the criteria. As predicted, subjects assigned 
to decreasing groups exhibited a worse performance in the last block, unlike the 
increasing group. Decreasing MSE feedback probably induced people to believe that 
they were not able to improve their memory performance giving rise to a worse DRM 
performance. On the other hand, increasing feedback induced people to believe in 
themselves and to maintain their performance. We cannot explain which types of 
feedback (positive/negative) better influenced memory performance in DRM tasks 
because no difference between the control group and experimental group was found. 
However, the significant difference in sensitivity, between decreasing and increasing 
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self-efficacy groups, is congruent with some evidence from previous research, 
showing that low MSE is associated with low willingness to expend mental effort and 
with high cognitive anxiety, both of which reduce the amount of processing resources 
available for performing a task. Our results can be explained when considering that 
the differences in sensitivity depend on different degrees of cognitive effort in the 
increasing and decreasing groups. Indeed high MSE consists in greater effort 
expenditure, greater persistence in the face of difficulties, higher performance goals, 
and lower state anxiety, which, as we showed, reduce DRM illusion propensity. 
Coherently with McDougall and Kang (2003) statement, that memory self-efficacy 
may or may not predict performance, depending on the congruence between 
predicted memory tasks and the memory tasks actually performed, in our study the 
feedback influenced recall performance, but not recognition and WM performance. 
Future research could consider replicating this experiment using feedback on 
recognition, also in order to extend the results of the first study that showed a 
significant effect of MSE on confidence ratings of critical false recognition. 
 
General discussion and conclusions 
We investigated an uncharted question: can the memory self-efficacy affects the 
production of false memories? 
In study 1, we found that MSE is related to WM and false memory. Moreover, the 
tendency to produce false memories in recall is predicted by a meta-memory 
component: the MSE. Indeed, coherently with SE theory (Bandura, 1997), we 
speculate that people who had a resilient self-efficacy were those who engaged more 
resources and utilized more effective coping strategies. Berry (1996) demonstrated 
that enhancement of memory performance depends on enhancing efficacy beliefs, 
which in turn increases resource allocation and the cognitive effort needed for deeper 
levels of cognitive processing (i.e., elaborative and associative coding and mental 
rehearsal). In turn, these beliefs are thought to lead to less effort expenditure, less 
persistence in the face of difficulties, lower performance goals, and higher anxiety 
during memory tasks, all factors that may lead to poorer performance on memory 
tasks (Bandura, 1989; Berry, 1999). Our results support this hypothesis. 
We believe that the experimental procedure used in the second study significantly 
influenced the recall task, because, as the cognitive consistency theory predict, 
feedbacks motivated subjects to reduce perceived discrepancies between their MSE 
and their perceived performance (Abelson et al., 1968), which in this case was 
strongly influenced by the feedback that we provided, in that specific memory 
domain (Bandura, 1997).  
Considering DRM performance, the interpretation of our findings is most 
consistent with the FTT of false memory. According to this account, more false 
memories in decreasing MSE group occur because of a more comprehensive gist 
recollection strategy that the first group assumes in order to improve their 
disappointing memory performance. Significantly, this strategy had no consequences 
on the recollection of presented words because it depends on verbatim trace. 
On the contrary, we think that the AMT does not explain our findings as well as 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
FTT. The reason is that in this case a more liberal monitoring decision criterion 
(Miller, 2011) in decreasing MSE should have produced more false memories but 
also more correct recall, resulting in a significant difference of the criterion parameter 
β between the two experimental groups. However, that is not what we observed. 
The only way to explain our findings, using the AMT, is pointing out that MSE 
influenced both activation and monitoring processes. Nevertheless, it seems not so 
plausible to us that a metacognitive process could influence an automatic process, as 
the spread activation, in so little time and just after two feedbacks.  
To conclude our two studies together coherently show that the level of MSE for 
words is related to memory performance in DRM tasks and that it has a causal effect 
on memory performance.  
In the future, new researches will be required which improve the experimental 
procedure aimed at assessing other possible feedback effects on the DRM task or 
other memory tasks; certainly other false memory paradigms based on episodic 
memory (e.g., the misinformation effect: Loftus, 2005; and imagination inflation: 
Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). 
 
Limitations of the present research 
A limit of this study is the lack of a BAS index for recognition distracters and 
Italian DRM lists, due to lack of a sufficiently wide corpus of associative norms in 
Italian. 
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Notes 
1. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Two groups of 
participants (experimental conditions) received two types of feedback on their 
performance. The control group did not receive any feedback. The information 
contained in the feedback was independent from the real performance in the DRM 
tasks. In the experimental high MSE group, subjects were told that their performance 
ranked at the 75.3 percentile, while in the low MSE experimental group subjects were 
told that their performance was low (i.e. 24.7 percentile). Self-efficacy theory 
suggests that in order for information to be persuasive it needs to come from an 
authoritative source; for this reason the subjects were told at the beginning of the 
experiment that the memory performance would be computed using a program. 
Indeed, during the recognition task, the experimenter acted as if recall data was being 
entered into data software in order to compute memory performance even though real 
performances had nothing to do with the feedback that was presented. Feedback 
needed to be very specific (containing a decimal) because a specific score is more 
credible, and it seems more plausible than generic information. Furthermore, the 
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second type of feedback was more coherent than the first. If participants were told 
that their score was 75.3% during initial feedback, subsequent feedback mentioned 
that their performance was 79.7% (increasing MSE). Conversely, if the initial 
feedback reported 24.7%, then it was reduced after the second block to 20.3% 
(decreasing MSE). Considering previous studies that induced changes in the sense of 
self-efficacy through feedback (Litt, 1988; Jacobs, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 1984), 
we assumed that this score oscillation was sufficient to induce a change in self-
efficacy and at the same time provided plausible and credible information (only two 
subjects said they did not believe the information provided by the experimenter; they 
were eliminated from the data set). 
2. The first result was computed subtracting the z mean score of critical (false) 
recall from the z mean score of hits. The criterion was also calculated as the ratio 
between the z mean scores of hits and critical lures (β = zhits / zcriticallures) and indicated 
the choice of recalling a word that could be a false memory (Heit, Brockdorff, & 
Lamberts, 2004). 
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Appendix 
Critical words and 15 words of english DRM lists. 
ANGER: mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, hatred, mean, calm, emotion, enrage  
CHAIR: table, sit, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, stool, sitting, rocking, bench 
CITY: town, crowded, state, capital, streets, subway, country, New York, village, metropolis, big, Chicago, suburb, county, urban 
MOUNTAIN: hill, valley, climb, summit, top, molehill, peak, plain, glacier, goat, bike, climber, range, steep, ski 
MUSIC: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody, horn, concert, instrument, symphony, jazz, orchestra, art, rhythm 
NEEDLE: thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble, haystack, thorn, hurt, injection, syringe, cloth, knitting 
RIVER: water, stream, lake, Mississippi, boat, tide, swim, flow, run, barge, creek, brook, fish, bridge, winding 
RUBBER: elastic, bounce, gloves, tire, ball, eraser, springy, foam, galoshes, soles, latex, glue, flexible, resilient, stretch 
SLEEP: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, drowsy 
SLOW: fast, lethargic, stop, listless, snail, cautious, delay, traffic, turtle, hesitant, speed, quick, sluggish, wait, molasses 
SMOKE: cigarette, puff, blaze, billows, pollution, ashes, cigar, chimney, fire, tobacco, stink, pipe, lungs, flames, stain 
SWEET: sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, tart, pie 
THIEF: steal, robber, crook, burglar, money, cop, bad, rob, jail, gun, villain, crime, bank, bandit, criminal 
TRASH: garbage, waste, can, refuse, sewage, bag, junk, rubbish, sweep, scraps, pile, dump, landfill, debris, litter 
 
(fromStadler, Roediger& McDermott 1999) 
Critical words and 15 words of italian DRM lists. 
RABBIA*: furioso, paura, odio, sdegno, malumore, furore, ira, collera, felice, lotta, arrabbiato, avversione, meschino, calma, 
emozione, imbestialire. 
SEDIA*: tavolo, sedersi, gambe, sedile, divano, scrivania, pieghevole, sofà, legno, cuscino, girevole, sgabello, seduto, poltrona, 
panchina. 
CITTÀ*: cittadina, affollato, stato, capitale, strade, metropolitana, paese, Roma, villaggio, metropoli, grande, Milano, sobborgo, 
contea, urbano. 
MONTAGNA: collina, valle, salita, cima, colle, picco, pianura, ghiacciaio, capra, bicicletta, scalatore, alta, scosceso, sciare. 
MUSICA*: nota, suono, pianoforte, cantare, radio, banda, melodia, corno, concerto, strumento, sinfonia, jazz, orchestra, arte, ritmo. 
AGO*: filo, spillo, occhio, cucire, acuto, punto, puntura, ditale, pagliaio, spina, ferita, iniezione, siringa, tessuto, maglia. 
FIUME*: aqua, torrente, lago Tevere, barca, marea, nuotare, flusso, corrente, chiatta, affluente, ruscello , pesce, ponte, sinuoso. 
GOMMA: elastico, rimbalzo, guanti, pneumatico, palla, cancellare, molla, gommapiuma, galosce, suole, lattice,colle,  flessibile, 
estendere, allungare. 
SONNO*: letto, riposo, sveglio, stanco, sogno, svegliare, pisolino, coperta, sonnecchiare, assopito, russare, siesta, pace, sbadiglio, 
sonnolento. 
LENTO*: veloce, inerte, fermo, svogliato, lumaca, prudente, ritardo, traffico, tartaruga, esitante, velocità, rapido, pigro, attendere, 
piano. 
FUMO*: sigaretta, soffio, accendino, nube, inquinamento, cenere, sigaro, camino, fuoco, tabacco, puzza, pipa, polmoni, fiamme, 
macchia. 
DOLCE*: acido, caramella, zucchero, amaro, buono, sapore, dente, goloso, miele, lievito, cioccolato, cuore, pasticcino, crostata, 
torta. 
LADRO*: rubare, rapinatore, truffatore, scassinatore, denaro, poliziotto, cattivo, scippatore, carcere, pistola, furfante, criminalità, 
banca, bandito, criminale. 
SPAZZATURA*: immondizia, rifiuti, bidone, pattume, liquame, busta, rottami, scarti, spazzare, frammenti, cumulo, scaricare, 
discarica, detriti, sporcizia. 
*Used in the second study too. 
 
